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Exchange Rate versus Capital Account
Liberalization in Nigeria: Some Important Issues
A. E. Akinlo and D. O. Yinusa*
I.

Introduction

T

he role of money in initiating and transmitting macroeconomic fluctuations
remains a question dividing opinions in the economics profession. Money
and economic fluctuations are closely associated as are money and price level
changes. These economic movements are often referred to as the business cycle-the
general fluctuations around a trend rate of aggregate output, employment, and the
rate of inflation. Indeed, few economists will question the long-term association
between money and economic growth. But economists will disagree over the
interpretation of these data. Monetarists argue that excessive changes in the rate of
money supply are the primary causes of the business cycle. Many Keynesian
economists not only dispute this claim but argue instead that changes in the growth of
monetary aggregates result in response to changes in the level of economic activity
(Dalgaard, 1987).
Economists also disagree over the degree to which money influences output and
prices. Changes in the supply of money and changes in the price level are strongly
correlated. The correlation between these changes was originally formulated years
ago as the quantity theory of money. At this point, it is clear that connection exists
between money, output and prices. As such, the question “does money matter?” has,
of late at least, been replaced by the question “how much does money matter?” The
recognition that “money matters” still does not resolve the issue of the direction or
magnitude of the relationship between money and the economy. It is really an
empirical issue. As such, there have been a number of approaches that have been used
for the purpose of evaluating the effects of money on output and prices in a typical
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developing economy like Nigeria . This study has become so important because an
understanding of this relationship will help monetary policy design and management
in a fast changing world. Also, the need for continuous research into this subject is
also highlighted by the reliance on monetary policy as the principal tool for economic
stabilisation in emerging market economies. Inflation and output fluctuations in
developing economies provide the occasion to re-examine alternative theories in the
context of fast-changing economic and social institutions. As monetary management
in these economies used to be the residual component of central planning, achieving a
better understanding of the interactions between money and other macroeconomic
variables is all the more imperative.
However, of all the prices in the economy, the exchange rate seems to occupy a very
strategic position by virtue of its role in linking a small open economy with the rest of
the world. As such, prominent attention will be given to brief but insightful review of
exchange rate management in Nigeria. Also, an attempt will be made to evolve
operational framework for fuller exchange rate liberalization and management, with
suggestions about pace and sequencing of exchange rate liberalization in Nigeria.
II.

Money-Output-Price Nexus-Some Theoretical Views

The essential role of money as the fundamental determinant of the price level can be
established in the context of a microeconomic general market-equilibrium
framework and a stylised consensus macroeconomic model. At a microeconomic
level, and under certain plausible and rational assumptions concerning agents'
preferences and optimising behaviour, the conditions for equilibrium in the product,
services, labour and asset markets determine the relative prices of goods and
services, the real wage (in terms of a general price index), and the spectrum of the
relative real rates of return on all assets, including the associated risk premia. The
determination of the general price level, and its rate of change, requires control of the
nominal quantity of base money or of some other monetary aggregates that can be
effectively controlled by the central bank. This result reflects the role of money both
as a medium of exchange and as a unit of account. Under price and wage flexibility,
and in the absence of any nominal rigidities, the price level will promptly and fully
respond to a change in the money stock. More generally, the determination of the
price level by the nominal quantity of money will be established in the long-run
equilibrium. At an aggregate, macroeconomic level, the fundamental proposition
1

Walsh (2003) has an excellent review of the various approaches that have been used to model the relationship between
money, output and prices in various economies covering different time dimensions.
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concerning the link between the supply of money and the price level is captured by
the quantity theory of money (Papademos, 2006).
The different views about the role of money in output and price fluctuations in
developing countries could be classified into four. The first view doubts the existence
of a systematic relationship among money, output and prices in developing
economies. It argues that many factors could be disruptive to money demand, for
example the release of the monetary overhang caused by quantity-rationing in the
regulated era, households' enhanced motive for precautionary saving, monetisation
and re-monetisation of some economic transactions, and increased financial
sophistication. Consequently, even if money does influence output and prices, the
relationship would not be sufficiently stable to be exploitable by monetary policy.
This argument may explain why many developing and transition economies opted
for exchange-rate-based stabilisation instead of money-based stabilization (Zhang
and Wan, 2004).
The second view holds that the major difficulty in targeting monetary aggregates in
developing and transition economies arises not from the instability of money
demand, but from the endogeneity of money (Peebles, 1991; Development Research
Institute, 1995; Chang and Hou, 1997). Setting up quantity targets is pointless when
the government lacks effective means or political will to achieve them. This does not
imply, however, that monetary aggregates should be consigned to oblivion. Rather,
money contains information about output, prices and other determinants of money
demand. As monetary data are relatively easier to collect, changes in monetary
aggregates should be monitored and fed into the formulation of fiscal, income,
interest rate and exchange rate policies.
Proponents of the third view refer to the fact that prior to financial liberalization;
developing countries' financial system was dominated by state banks (Bennett and
Dixon, 2001). Most firms, particularly state-owned enterprises (SOEs), rely on bank
credits to finance investment or even working capital. Therefore, monetary policy
impacts directly on aggregate demand and supply via bank lending. Its effects on
prices are uncertain due to the non-monetary causes of inflation such as relative price
realignment, price reform, fluctuations in grain prices, currency devaluation, and so
on.
By contrast, the fourth view disputes the link between money and real activity. It
claims that certain institutional features of the Nigerian economy, such as
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government commitment to supporting the SOEs, make it possible for firms to
circumvent financial constraints (Wang, 1991; Brandt and Zhu, 2000, 2001). Hence,
changes in money supply will largely affect prices rather than real activity.
The studies attempting to estimate the demand function of real balances embody the
fifth view. Implicit in this argument is the monetarist view that changes in money
lead, on a one-to-one basis, to changes in prices in the same direction. Money may
affect real output temporarily. In the long run, real output tends towards its 'natural'
level which is determined by the amount of labour, capital, natural resources,
technology and institutions, yet independent of the stock of money.
To assess the extent to which the competing views are borne out by reality, it is
desirable to use a framework of sufficient generality to encompass all the
alternatives. This would ensure the comparability of the testing results. A suitable
vehicle is the equation of exchange, MV ?
PT , where M is the stock of nominal
balances, V is the velocity of circulation, T is the amount of total transactions, and
P a price index of T . The logarithmic form of the exchange equation is
m?
v?
p?
t........................................ ..............................(1)

where the lower case letters represent the logarithms of the variables denoted by the
corresponding upper case letters. Although an ex post identity, equation (1) can be
turned into stylised representations of views 2 to 5 when supplemented with causal
assumptions. Before the transformation can be done, however, three modifications to
the equation are necessary: (i) Total transactions need to be replaced by a measure of
final output, since it is the latter that is of more interest to policy decisions. As there is
no obvious reason that the ratio of total output to total transaction will stay constant,
the coefficient on may not be unitary. (ii) As a store of value, money competes with
other forms of asset. The rate of return on alternative assets may bear significantly on
velocity if money can be easily substituted for by the other assets. Therefore, a
nominal interest rate that proxies for the opportunity cost of holding money should be
included in the monetary equilibrium relationship. (iii) Price-money homogeneity is
routinely pre imposed in previous studies about money demand. Since the factors
affecting prices did not coincide exactly with those affecting money, the validity of
this claim needs to be verified. Thus, the coefficients on money and prices should not
be restricted to be equal as in equation (1). With these modifications, equation (1)
becomes
m?
a 3i ?
a1 y ?
a2 p............................................................(2)
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where i is the nominal interest rate. Equation (2) can now be used as the framework
for turning the alternative views into structural models. The necessary condition for
the first view to hold is the absence of a stable relationship among the four variables
in equation (2). Should such a relationship exist, equation (2) adequately describes
the monetary equilibrium. Adding different behavioural assumptions to the equation
yields four stylised monetary models, each corresponding to one of the remaining
views. The view of endogenous money implies a model where the supply of nominal
balances adjusts to meet the demand for nominal balances.
The amount of money in existence is determined by the level of real output, prices
and velocity (which in turn is influenced by the nominal interest rate). The model
representing the third view is similar to the naïve LM model: prices are rigid; the
stock of money is exogenously determined by money supply; changes in money
supply affect real output. According to the fourth view, the effects of changes in
money supply fall primarily on prices. It is thus essentially a hypothesis about the
determination of prices. A representation of this view can be obtained from equation
(2) by making prices the endogenous variable. The fifth view rests upon three
assumptions exogenous money, endogenous prices and the proportionality between
money and prices. Restricting the coefficient on price to unity and making real
balances the dependent variable changes equation (2) into a model for the fifth view.
Fig. 1: Evolution of Money, Output and Prices in Nigeria
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Clearly, the empirical relevance of these models would vary with the time horizon of
investigation. For example, endogenous variables may anticipate as well as respond
to changes in exogenous variables. Such interactions complicate the short-run
temporal ordering of changes in exogenous and endogenous variables.
Investigations focusing on the short-run may end up with supporting evidence for
several views. Furthermore, some of the implications of the five views are more
tenable in the long-run. Because the adaptation of expectations and adjustment of
prices take time to complete, short-run investigations may fail to detect any stable
link among the variables even though an equilibrium relationship does exist. By the
same token, the price-money homogeneity postulated by view 5 may only be
discernible in the long-run. A proper empirical evaluation of what the observed
relation between money, prices and output means causally, therefore, necessitates
differentiating between the short-run and the long-run.
At the empirical level, a first and important finding is that there is strong and robust
evidence concerning the long-term relationship between money and prices, based on
data collected for many countries and over long periods of time. McCandless and
Weber (1995), Odusola and Akinlo (2001) and Akinlo (2006) find that the correlation
between inflation and the growth of money is close to 1, varying between 0.92 and
0.96, depending on the definition of money used, as suggested by theory. The
existence of a strong and stable long-term relationship between inflation and money
growth is documented by many other studies, including a number of major studies on
Nigeria. It is also interesting to note that the relationship between inflation and
money growth is particularly close for high-inflation countries (Walsh, 2003). These
findings are, of course, important and consistent with theory. But because robust
correlations and long-term relationships need not imply causality, and because we
are also interested in the links between money and prices over shorter time periods,
we have to examine other types of evidence.
One approach employed in recent empirical studies to study the impact of monetary
phenomena on the economy is based on vector autoregressions (VARs)2, which were
pioneered by Sims (1972, 1980) and further developed and extensively applied by
Christiano and his colleagues. This approach has the merit that it is not constrained by
a particular specification of the underlying structural relationships, and it provides
evidence on the intertemporal response of the price level and output to a change in the
monetary policy stance.
2

Among the excellent recent application of this methodology are Leeper, Sim and Zha (1996), Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), King and Watson (1996).
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Role of the Foreign Exchange Markets

Foreign exchange markets have the role of facilitating and channeling the flow of
currency between prospective buyers and sellers of foreign currency. It is an
important market not only because of its role in linking a small open economy with
the rest of the world, but because of the effects of the developments in this market in
influencing macroeconomic outcomes in the economy. This raises the issue of
whether to fix or float a currency. Indeed, adopting fixed exchange rates is an extreme
where countries must give heavy weight to the foreign exchange market in setting
domestic macro policy even in the short-run and 100% weight over the longer term.
Extreme opposite of virtually ignoring the exchange rate in setting domestic macro
policy should apply only to the largest most closed economies (Willett, 2001). In
between the extremes, the smaller and more open the economy, and the greater the
degree of dollarization of the economy, the greater is the weight that should be given
to foreign exchange market developments in setting domestic macroeconomic policy
(Yinusa, 2007). Nigeria belongs to the “in between” group and as such, prominent
attention should be given to developments in the foreign exchange market in
designing macroeconomic policies to avoid unintended consequences. There would
be no need for such a market if there were no international trade or capital
movements. Growing liberalisation of foreign trade and deregulation of capital
movements in Nigeria from the mid 1980s increased the need for a market where
financial companies could trade foreign currency for Naira.
IV.

Exchange Rate Management in Nigeria

Exchange rate management in Nigeria has evolved over the years spanning various
exchange rate pricing regimes. Sequel to a major provision of the enabling law
establishing the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) under exchange rate policy,
maintenance of a healthy balance of payments (BOP) position and the preservation of
the external value of the naira has been the major task given to the CBN. In its nearly
five decades of existence, the CBN has adopted several foreign exchange
management options in an attempt to achieve these objectives and more. Between
1960 and 1986, the country operated the fixed exchange rate regime backed by
control measures under different genres. For example, between 1960 and 1967, the
country's currency (the Nigerian pound) was fixed at par with the British pound. But
from 1967 to 1974, the Nigerian naira (the new name for the country's currency) was
pegged to the US dollar. Also, in April 1974, the authorities started a policy of
progressive appreciation of the naira to reflect the improved strength of the naira as a
result of enhanced foreign exchange receipts due to the oil boom and the improved
BOP position.
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There was, however, a policy reversal late in 1976 when dwindling oil fortunes and
foreign reserves due to the oil glut, led to the fixing of the naira using import weighted
3
basket of currencies of Nigeria's seven major trading partners (Komolafe, 1996 and
Obaseki, 1991). This currency basket system under the fixed exchange rate
mechanism actually ran from 1978 to 1986.
The effects of this pegged exchange rate mechanism are legion. The naira became
overvalued, the economy became distorted and there was unbridled importation of
finished consumer goods which had dire consequences for domestic production, the
level of external reserves and the BOP position. Sharp practices on the part of dealers
and end users of foreign exchange compounded the problem leading to prolonged
BOP problem.
It was against this background that the market based Second-Tier Foreign Exchange
Market (SFEM) was introduced in September 1986 as the corner stone of the
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Among the problems this liberalized
system was expected to solve included finding a realistic value for the naira, ensuring
the competitiveness of goods produced in the country, addressing the problem of
import dependence and capital flight, attracting foreign investment into the country
and reducing the spread between the official and parallel market exchange rates. To
address these problems, this market based system has undergone a lot of fine-tuning
and witnessed the adoption of various methods. For example, in July 1987, the first
and second tier markets were merged into the Foreign Exchange Market (FEM). By
March 1992, there had been a complete floating of the naira instead of predetermining quotas. There was, however, a policy reversal in 1994 with the
introduction of “guided deregulation” by which the exchange rate of the naira to the
dollar was fixed at 22.00. This ultimately led to the introduction of the Autonomous
Foreign Exchange Market (AFEM) and the abolition of the 1962 Exchange Control
Act in 1995.
But like any regulated system in Nigeria, AFEM failed because of inherent abuses,
sharp practices and bureaucratic bottlenecks. In October 1999, AFEM gave way to
the Inter-Bank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM) which was expected to shore up the
value of the naira and achieve a realistic naira exchange rate. However, because of
persistent high demand for foreign exchange culminating in continued depreciation
3

The seven currencies include US dollar, British pound, German mark, French franc, Japanese yen, Dutch
guilder and the Swiss franc.
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of the naira, persistent depletion of foreign exchange reserves and widening premium
between the official and parallel market exchange rates, IFEM was also abandoned.
In July 2002, the Dutch Auction System (DAS) was re-introduced to address the
problems identified under IFEM. Under the DAS, end-users, through their
authorized dealers buy foreign exchange at their bid rates, and the rate that clears the
market (marginal rate) is adopted as the ruling rate till the next bid session, with the
CBN intervening twice weekly. DAS has succeeded in ensuring a sustained accretion
to the country's foreign reserves (which now stand at $40b), narrowing the arbitrage
premium between official and parallel market rates (IMF, 2003) and achieving a
more realistic exchange rate value for the naira. Indeed to further consolidate on these
gains, the authorities introduced a variant of the DAS - the Wholesale Dutch Auction
System (WDAS) in February, 2006. The CBN also licensed some commercial banks
to establish Bureau de Change (BDCs) in a bid to checkmate the activities of parallel
market operators. Furthermore, in the last quarter of 2006, the CBN appointed
fourteen foreign banks to manage about $7b of Nigeria's external reserves.
All these efforts, plus the recent consolidation in the banking industry account for the
sustained accretion to the country's foreign reserves, narrowing of the premium
between the parallel and official exchange rates and the enhanced value of the naira
exchange rates.
V.

Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market

Under currency pegs, official purchases and sales of foreign currency to bridge the
gap between foreign currency supply and demand at a given price are often rulesbased in that the timing and amount of intervention are predetermined. In contrast,
official intervention in the foreign exchange market is optional, or discretionary,
under a flexible exchange rate regime, although authorities still can and do intervene,
usually to correct misalignments, calm disorderly markets, supply foreign exchange,
and accumulate reserves. Thus, a government that is shifting to a flexible regime
needs to formulate policies on the objectives, timing, and amounts of intervention.
Like all other markets, foreign exchange markets are imperfect. For example,
“herding” (when investors buy or sell en masse) and “feedback trading” (trading
driven by price movements rather than fundamentals) may result in the misalignment
of a currency with a country's economic fundamentals, with serious repercussions.
Among other things, an overvalued currency undermines the competitiveness of the
country's exports, while an undervalued exchange rate could stoke inflation.
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Moreover, when a country's capital account is not fully liberalized, or its capital
market is inefficient, temporary shocks may trigger exchange rate volatility in “thin”
markets. Volatility can be politically costly because the exchange rate serves as a
symbolic measure of a government's success in macroeconomic management. And
long-lasting misalignments and erratic exchange rate movements can subject cost
and income projections in the real sector to wide margins of error, making long-term
planning and investment difficult. However, misalignments are difficult to detect,
and there is no consensus on a methodology for estimating the equilibrium exchange
rate. The indicators used most frequently the nominal and real effective exchange
rates, productivity and other competitiveness measures, the terms of trade, the
balance of payments, interest rate differentials, and parallel market exchange ratesusually do not enable policymakers to assess the degree of misalignment accurately
enough to help them determine the optimal timing and amount of intervention.
Even when policymakers detect exchange rate misalignment or destabilizing
volatility, central bank intervention may not always correct the problem. The
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of intervention in influencing the exchange
rate is mixed, and the impact of intervention on the exchange rate level appears to be
short-lived. Empirical studies have also found that intervention tends to increase,
rather than decrease, exchange rate volatility (Adubi, 2002). Thus, short-term
exchange rate volatility may not warrant intervention, especially when it occurs in a
liquid, or orderly market. Volatility may reflect the market process of price discovery
and provide useful signals to policymakers and market participants.
Central bank intervention is usually justified, however, to calm disorderly markets
that is, markets with unequal number of sellers and buyers of foreign exchange,
resulting in illiquidity. If market illiquidity persists, it can hurt the real economy.
Although volatility that is due to disorderly markets and that is likely to lead to a
collapse of liquidity is also difficult to detect, acceleration in exchange rate changes,
widening bid-offer spreads, and a sharp increase in inter bank trades relative to
customer-bank turnover are signs to watch for. Central banks may also have to
intervene in the foreign exchange market to supply foreign currency or build up their
reserves. First, many central banks have a regular supply of foreign currency because
of income on foreign reserves and their roles as the bankers of governments that
borrow or receive aid in foreign currency. Second, they normally target a certain level
of reserves, requiring the regular purchase of foreign currency to maintain core
reserve coverage ratios.
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A country may need to re-evaluate its international-reserve management policy when
it moves to a flexible exchange rate regime. On the one hand, the level of reserves
required to maintain a flexible rate may be lower than that required to maintain a
fixed one. In addition, improved supervision of private sector foreign currency
exposures may reduce reserve requirements. On the other hand, the elimination of
capital controls may create a need for higher reserves to maintain or boost market
confidence and lower exchange rate volatility, reduce the likelihood of crises, and
increase the effectiveness of intervention, while providing funds for the government
to invest in longer-term assets with higher returns. In general, central banks should be
selective in their interventions and parsimonious in their use of foreign reserves. The
difficulty of detecting exchange rate misalignments and disorderly markets means
that decisions on the timing and amount of intervention are subjective and may be off
the mark. Moreover, by entering the market infrequently, central banks can convince
the markets of their commitment to exchange rate flexibility and improve the
potential effectiveness of the occasional intervention. When a country introduces a
band as part of a gradual move to exchange rate flexibility, intervention episodes may
be more frequent than under more flexible regimes; nonetheless, central banks
should minimize the number of interventions and make full use of the exchange rate
flexibility allowed by the width of the band. Central banks in many advanced
economies (for example, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) seldom
intervene in the foreign exchange market.
Transparency also helps build confidence in the new exchange rate regime,
especially in the aftermath of a forced exit. Many countries, including the Philippines
and Turkey, issued statements and policy reports affirming that they were committed
to a flexible exchange rate regime and that they would not intervene in the foreign
exchange market to target a certain exchange rate level. The published intervention
policies of Australia and Sweden are good examples of the policies that need to be
developed and communicated to the market to enhance the effectiveness of official
foreign exchange operations. Disclosing information on intervention with a time lag
can improve market transparency and central bank accountability. The United
Kingdom discloses information on intervention in a monthly press release, the
European Central Bank in a monthly bulletin; the U.S. Treasury confirms
interventions on the day they take place and provides additional details in quarterly
reports.
Selected country experiences suggest that rules-based intervention may be useful
when the exchange rate is not under a lot of pressure in a one-sided market. Such a
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policy may help countries supply foreign exchange or accumulate reserves without
affecting the exchange rate. Eventually, however, central banks will gain enough
experience and credibility to intervene on a more discretionary basis. Rules-based
intervention policies tend to be transitory, abandoned or modified by most countries
(for example, Brazil and Canada).
VI.

Foreign Exchange Market Efficiency-A Must for Successful
Liberalization

Duttagupta, Fernandez and Karacadag, (2005), Laurens (2005) and Mishkin, (2007)
suggest that the following steps can help a country improve the depth and efficiency
of its foreign exchange market:
? Allowing some exchange rate flexibility (for example, within a band around a
peg) to stimulate foreign exchange activity. Authorities should also foster a
sense of two-way risk in the exchange rate - the risk that the currency may
either appreciate or depreciate - to encourage market participants to take both
short and long positions. Between 1995 and 2001, turnover increased in the
foreign exchange markets of countries that adopted more flexible exchange
rate regimes and declined in countries that adopted less flexible regimes.
? Reducing the central bank's market-making role by cutting back its trade with
banks and its interventions to allow scope for other market makers. The
central bank should not trade with non-financial customers.
? Increasing market information on the sources and uses of foreign exchange
and on balance of payments trends to enable market participants to develop
credible views on exchange rate and monetary policy and price foreign
exchange efficiently.
? Authorities should also ensure that information systems and trading
platforms provide real-time bid and offer quotations in the inter-bank market.
? Phasing out or eliminating regulations that stifle market activity. Important
measures would include abolishing requirements to surrender foreign
exchange receipts to the central bank, taxes and surcharges on foreign
exchange transactions, and restrictions on inter-bank trading; unifying
segmented foreign exchange markets; and relaxing current and some capital
account restrictions to increase the sources and uses of foreign exchange in
the market. Capital controls should be eased gradually, however, and only
after certain macroeconomic and institutional preconditions have been met.
? Unifying and simplifying foreign exchange legislation and avoiding
frequent, ad hoc changes to the law, so as to increase market transparency and
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reduce transaction costs.
? Improving the market's microstructure by reducing market segmentation,
increasing the effectiveness of market intermediaries, and securing reliable
and efficient settlement systems.
Developing and deepening the foreign exchange market is more complicated when a
country is forced to abandon a peg under market pressure and has not had time to
prepare for an orderly exit.
The government is likely to face conflicting objectives. On the one hand, it needs to
sell foreign exchange to prevent excessive depreciation. On the other, to maintain
market credibility it needs to signal that it will not intervene to defend a particular
exchange rate level. Under these circumstances, many countries have gradually
renounced the central bank's market-making role, removed barriers to foreign
exchange market operations, and tolerated greater exchange rate volatility, while
allowing interest rates to rise to counter market pressure and monitoring market
transactions to determine the sources and direction of other flows. However, the
negative effects of volatility and rising interest rates on investment need to be
weighed with the benefits of increased flexibility (Yinusa, 2007).
VII.

Pace and Sequencing of Exchange Rate Liberalization

Countries face certain trade-offs in choosing between a rapid exit from a peg and a
more gradual move to a floating exchange rate regime. A rapid approach involves
fewer intermediate steps, if any, between fixed and floating regimes than a gradual
approach.
For a country with a strong macro economy and a prudent monetary policy, a rapid
approach can be a more credible signal of commitment to exchange rate flexibility
than a gradual approach, while allowing the country to limit its interventions in the
foreign exchange market and, thereby, conserve its foreign exchange reserves
(Laurens, 2005). Countries seeking greater monetary policy independence may also
be better off moving rapidly, as may those with an open capital accountit may be
harder to pursue a gradual exit strategy in the presence of large and volatile capital
flows. However, a gradual approach is preferable if a country lacks the appropriate
institutional framework, including a deep foreign exchange market and the ability to
monitor and manage exchange rate risk; such a country runs a high risk of
experiencing excessive exchange rate volatility if it moves too quickly (Calvo,
1996).
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The absence of a full-fledged inflation-targeting framework as an alternative
nominal anchor need not preclude a rapid exit strategy, if there is a robust
commitment to price stability. The building blocks of inflation targeting such as
fiscal discipline, the monetary authorities' operational independence in pursuit of
low inflation, credible steps to contain inflation, and transparency and accountability
are fundamental to the success of any monetary policy regime regardless of whether
inflation targeting is formally adopted. South Africa exited from a fixed peg to a float
in the early 1980s but did not formally adopt inflation targeting until 2000. Other
countries forced to float in one step for example, Mexico and Turkey used monetary
targeting as an interim strategy before adopting inflation targeting.
A gradual approach allows the country to move toward a free float in measured steps
for example, by shifting from a fixed peg against a single currency to a fixed or
crawling peg against a basket of currencies, and then to an exchange rate band that is
increased in increments.
Pegging to a basket of currencies has the advantage of reducing the transmission of
external shocks to the domestic economy and tempering the exchange rate's exposure
to the potentially erratic movements of a single currency. The basket may be
composed of a weighted average of the currencies of a country's main trading
partners. A shift to a crawling peg against a basket of currencies can help a country
maintain its external competitiveness if its inflation rates are different from those of
its trading partners. Moving to a horizontal or crawling exchange rate band can
provide greater exchange rate flexibility and monetary policy independence. While
these variants of pegged regimes are easier to maintain than wide exchange rate
bands and floats, they constrain monetary policy and can be difficult for countries
with liberalized capital accounts to sustain. In either case, whether the exit is rapid or
gradual, each step forward should ensure two-way risk in exchange rate movements.
Early preparation for the move to a floating exchange rate increases the likelihood
that the exit will be successful. A country should begin to lay the groundwork for the
exit while it still has a peg, securing central bank independence, improving its ability
to forecast inflation, making monetary policy more transparent, developing
information systems on foreign exchange risk, and increasing information on
balance of payments developments. Once it has laid the groundwork, it can move to a
second stage, introducing some exchange rate flexibility to stimulate activity in the
foreign exchange market, while it develops the other tools it will need to operate the
new regime. Intervention policies can be addressed later in the transition.
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Although policymakers have no control over the pace of a disorderly exit, they still
need to make decisions about sequencing. Their top priority should be to stabilize the
exchange rate; often, this can be done by eliminating the shortage of dollars in the
market and maintaining monetary control. Policymakers should also attempt to
signal a conservative monetary policy, although the design of an alternative nominal
anchor will probably require more time. Adopting a flexible exchange rate before
liberalizing the capital account enables a country to absorb capital account shocks at
a lower cost to the real economy than under a fixed exchange rate.
By contrast, liberalizing the capital account first can help offset temporary current
account shocks, expand the range of instruments available for risk management, and
deepen the foreign exchange market. Accordingly, when an exchange rate is floated
before the capital account is liberalized, central bank intervention may be needed to
offset temporary current account shocks and to limit excessive real exchange rate
volatility.
The experiences of emerging market economies over the past decade highlight the
risks of opening the capital account before adopting a flexible exchange rate. Many
countries were forced off pegs after sudden reversals of capital flows under open
capital accounts (for example, Mexico at the end of 1994, Thailand in July 1997, and
Brazil in early 1999). Others faced heavy inflows and upward pressure on pegged
rates and had to allow exchange rate flexibility to avoid overheating the economy (for
example, Chile and Poland during the 1990s). Thus, even under favorable economic
conditions, opening the capital account before introducing exchange rate flexibility
can threaten domestic liquidity, create macroeconomic imbalances, and precipitate
speculative attacks.
In all, one can safely say that while it is better to plan an exit in a calm economic
environment, even planned exits do not necessarily last. Many countries have
reversed course after adopting a flexible exchange rate regime. Either
macroeconomic conditions or a lack of institutions or both may contribute to the
reversal from a float to a fixed regime. Fiscal dominance played an important role in
the reversals of both Russia (1993-95) and Venezuela (2002-03), while Nigeria's
reversal in 1994 occurred amid concerns about excessive depreciation. Other
obstacles to floating in many developing countries include the limited number of
participants in the foreign exchange market, pervasive exchange controls, a weak
technological infrastructure, and underdeveloped money markets. Both fixed and
floating exchange rates have distinct and different advantages. No single exchange
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rate regime is appropriate for all countries in all circumstances. Countries will have to
weigh the costs and benefits of floating in the light of both their economic and
institutional readiness.
VIII. Conclusion
Given what we know so far, a reasonable view might be that liberalization brings
about desirable effects in the long-run but it is dangerous in the medium run. The next
natural question is how to reap the benefits without incurring the costs, or with
minimal costs. This section concludes with some possible solutions.
Wait. Most countries will eventually liberalize, but this needs to be done as a matter
of priority. When is the time ripe? A first answer is provided by the ubiquitous
contrast between the effects of liberalization in the developing and the developed
countries. It suggests that, if one wants to avoid, at least to limit boom-and-bust
cycles and high exchange pressure volatility, it may be useful to wait until a proper
economic, and, possibly political infrastructure has been built. This may take years,
if not decades. The implicit strategy advocated in the early 1990s, that economic
liberalization will force economic and political progress, is dangerous: its success
remains to be demonstrated and it is a bit too machiavellian to be comfortable with.
Buckle up. The experience from both developing and developed countries suggests
that liberalization is a source of widespread instability. Two conclusions follow. It is
important to set up adequate welfare systems before liberalizing. Free markets may
raise efficiency, but they are known to increase inequality, at least initially. Boomand-bust cycles affect more seriously the poorer, less educated segments of the
population. In addition, the boom years must be used to prepare for the bust years.
Fiscal policy, in particular, ought to be used to build up public savings which will be
available to combat financial meltdowns and protect those most hurt by the bust, if it
happens.
Float or dollarize? Well, not necessarily. Is there a way out of the hard choice
between waiting for decades and getting ready for acute volatility? One idea,
defended among others by Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz, (2001) and
Eichengreen (1994) is to avoid the middle ground of pegged exchange rates, and opt
for either of the two extremes, fully floating exchange rates and hard pegs (currency
boards, monetary unions or dollarization). Some progress could be achieved by
comparing liberalizing countries which adopted floating exchange rate regimes and

Akinlo and Yinusa: Exchange Rate versus Capital Account Liberalization in Nigeria

85

those that maintained, or sought to maintain, soft pegs. Unfortunately, identifying
truly floating exchange rates is proving to be a tricky exercise. Calvo and Reinhart
(2000) and Benassy-Quéré and Coeuré (2000) show that many countries which
declare floating exchange rate regimes in fact heavily manage their currencies.
While it is true that currency crises cannot formally occur when the exchange rate is
freely floating, pressure can take the form of excessive exchange rate fluctuations.
Such fluctuations may have very severe effects, in terms of both competitiveness and
currency exposure by various economic agents. The view that floating is an option for
each and every country fails to recognize the benefits from exchange rate stability,
especially in countries which are open and have limited financial market services.
Europe's eagerness to limit exchange rate fluctuation, delaying for 40 years financial
liberalization, provides an example of a successful strategy. Hard pegs, on the other
side, are in vogue, but their costs (e.g. in Argentina) and the difficulty of designing
credible exit strategies are being increasingly recognized. It seems fair to predict that
the debate on 'extremes vs. the soft middle' will end up in a draw, much as it happened
with the older debate on 'fixed vs. flexible rates'. Given that exchange rate regimes
carry enormously widespread implications, a few simple criteria are unlikely ever to
settle the debate. On the other side, it is crucial to realize ex ante that liberalization
rocks the exchange markets. Building some form of exchange rate flexibility (either
by floating or by being ready to realign pegs) into the liberalization program is
essential. An appreciation (or revaluation) during the early capital inflow phase,
clearly understood and presented to be temporary, could reduce the overheating. A
depreciation (or devaluation) when and if the inflows reverse themselves into
outflows and/or the economy slows down, could avoid an all-out attack and the
subsequent output crash.
One step at a time. The seminal sequencing strategy advocated by McKinnon
(1991) is to start with domestic goods market liberalization, then to open up to trade,
and then to proceed to domestic financial liberalization before finally setting free the
capital account, possibly starting with long-term assets and keeping short-term
assets for the last step. This strategy has not been proven wrong so far. The most
delicate steps are those involving domestic financial and capital account
liberalization. Since they also tend to work in the same direction at the same horizon,
spreading these measures several years apart seems reasonable.
Microeconomics matter. Structural conditions should be explicitly considered. The
fact that crises are more likely when goods markets are not free, when banking
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regulation and supervision is rudimentary, when corruption is rampant, and when
property rights are not well established, is overwhelming. This is given a prominent
position in McKinnon's list, and it should remain that way. There is little point in
liberalizing domestic and external financial markets when the goods markets and the
financial institutions do not function properly. Extreme examples like Nigeria even
suggest that financial liberalization under such conditions is likely to do more harm
than good.
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